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Resumo 
 
Este trabalho foi realizado com o objetivo de compreender o impacto que a 
crise financeira que começou nos Estados Unidos e a crise da dívida soberana 
na Europa tiveram na estrutura de capitais das empresas cotadas de Portugal e 
da Irlanda. Esta análise foi realizada para uma amostra de 18 anos dividida em 
três períodos diferentes: período pré-crise, período da crise nos Estados Unidos 
e o período da crise europeia. 
Baseada na revisão de literatura, foi feita uma análise a diferentes 
determinantes que influenciam estrutura de capitais, nomeadamente: a 
Rentabilidade, a Dimensão, a Tangibilidade, as Oportunidades de Crescimento, 
Outros Benefícios Fiscais para além da Dívida, a Singularidade e a Taxa de 
Imposto. Esta análise permitiu perceber quais destes determinantes 
influenciaram a escolha de financiamento das empresas entre 2000 e 2017. 
Os resultados da regressão mostraram que a estrutura de capitais das 
empresas portuguesas e irlandesas não foram tão afetadas assim por estes 
determinantes como seria de esperar pela literatura. Foi demonstrado que a 
Dimensão das empresas teve impacto no período de pré-crise (2000 a 2007) nos 
dois países e teve impacto nas empresas irlandesas no período da crise europeia 
(2011 a 2017). As Oportunidades de Crescimento das empresas portuguesas 
influenciaram a escolha de financiamento durante o período de crise da dívida 
soberana europeia. Empresas portuguesas com mais oportunidades de crescer 
escolheram ter menos dívida. A Rentabilidade, Singularidade e a Taxa de 
Imposto não tiveram nenhum impacto na escolha de financiamento das 
empresas tanto portuguesas como irlandesas ao longo dos 18 anos da amostra. 
 
Palavras-chave: Estrutura de Capitais, Crise Financeira, Crise da Dívida 
Soberana Europeia, Portugal, Irlanda 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis was made with the main goal of finding what was the impact that 
the financial crisis in the United States and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
had on the capital structure of the Portuguese and Irish listed firms. This 
analysis was conducted for an 18 years’ time sample, divided in three different 
periods: pre-crisis period, US financial crisis period and the period of the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis.  
After reviewing the literature, an analysis was made using different 
determinants that influence the capital structure: Profitability, Firm Size, 
Tangibility, Growth Opportunities, Non-debt Tax Shields, Uniqueness and Tax 
Rate. This analysis allowed to understand which of these variables would 
influence the financing decisions of Portuguese and Irish firms between 2000 
and 2017. 
The results show that the impact of these determinants was not as expected. 
We can infer that Firm Size had impact on the financing decision during the 
pre-crisis period (2000 to 2007) in both countries’ firms, plus it has impact on 
the Irish firms during the period of crisis in Europe (2011 to 2017). The Growth 
Opportunities of Portuguese companies influenced the financing decisions 
during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis period. Portuguese companies with 
more growth opportunities choose to have less leverage. Profitability, 
Uniqueness and Tax Rate had no significant impact on the listed firms’ capital 
structure in either the three periods for neither the two countries in study. 
 
Keywords: Capital Structure, US Financial Crisis, European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, Portugal, Ireland 
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Introduction  
 
Capital Structure is a long-studied concept by several authors and still today, 
there is not a correct answer as to the right way chosen by firms to finance 
themselves and their projects.  This work presents a study with the objective of 
finding out the behavior of the Portuguese and Irish firms during the economic 
crisis period. That said, we look to answer to the following research question: 
“What was the impact of the US financial crisis and the European Sovereign 
Debt crisis in the Portuguese and Irish listed firms’ capital structure?” 
Durand (1952) was the first author to discuss the capital structure theme, 
developing a traditional view in which he believed in the existence of an 
optimal capital structure which maximized firm value. Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) were the following to discuss it and are the authors of two propositions – 
Proposition I and II. Proposition I explains that in a market characterized by 
perfect conditions, companies in the same business would have the same value. 
Proposition II establishes a relationship between debt ratio and cost of equity. 
Later, in 1963, the same authors added corporate taxes to their model. 
Trade-off and Pecking Order are both well-known theories among the choice 
of financing taken by firms. It is known that the Trade-Off theory defends that 
firms must have an optimal debt ratio; meanwhile the Pecking Order Theory 
establishes an order that firms must follow to raise external funds preferring 
internal over external financing and debt over equity [Myers (1984) and Myers 
and Majluf (1984)]. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also studied the capital 
  2 
structure theme using the choices made by managers to fund new investments 
and elaborated the Agency Theory. 
All who studied this theme seem to align that there are determinants that 
influence this choice within firms. The most common determinants are the ones 
studied in this thesis: Profitability, Firm Size, Tangibility, Growth 
Opportunities, Non-debt Tax Shields, Uniqueness and Tax Rate. 
Profitability was found by most of the authors to have a negative 
relationship with debt, as firms that were more profitable had less debt [Ozkan 
(2001), Harris and Raviv (1991) and Rajan and Zingales (1995)], except by Frank 
and Goyal (2009) who established a positive relationship, more profits meant 
more usage of debt as they had lower bankruptcy costs. 
Firm size was defended by the Trade-off theory to have a positive 
relationship with debt ratio, since larger and more diversified firms face lower 
risk of default, they had higher leverage ratio - Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) agree with the theory 
findings. 
As firm assets can be used as collateral on a bank loan, Frank and Goyal 
(2009) have also established a positive relationship within tangibility and 
leverage. Myers and Majluf (1984) defend the same relationship. 
Between growth opportunities and leverage, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Fama and French (2002), in accordance with the Trade-off theory, defend a 
negative relationship. Also, it is expected that firms with more unique products 
want to avoid bankruptcy, therefore avoiding having debt (Harris and Raviv, 
1991). 
Non-debt tax shields and Tax Rate have opposed expected relationships with 
leverage. Having more debt, firms can take advantage of tax shields that come 
within, the relationship of tax rate with leverage is positive (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973). 
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This dissertation analyses listed firms from Portugal and Ireland. The firms 
chosen needed to have at least one year, of the eighteen analyzed, with a total 
assets’ value to make it into the sample. The choice of analyzing listed firms is 
justified by the fact that these are firms that can ask for external financing by 
issuing equity easier or by having better access to bank loans.  
As we know, several countries in Europe were affected by the financial crisis 
that started in the United States and quickly turned out to be a global crisis. 
Consequently, Europe suffered with a subsequent crisis - the European 
Sovereign debt crisis. Between the five most affected countries – Portugal, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy and Cyprus – the choice of Portugal and Ireland among the 
others was made because both were intervened by European Union and by the 
International Monetary Fund, but achieving different results. 
In order to answer the research question presented above, an econometric 
model was created, and the capital structure determinants mentioned above 
were used in this same model – even though some of the results found are not 
the ones expected by literature reading and analysis. 
We were able to conclude that Profitability and Tax Rate had no influence on 
capital structure in either of the countries or any of the three different periods. 
On the other side, the Size of the firm was found has having some impact in the 
Irish listed firms during the European Sovereign debt crisis period. Another 
determinant that influenced capital structure was the Non-debt tax shields, as it 
is significant for Irish firms during the pre-crisis period and for Portuguese 
firms during the European sovereign debt crisis period. The rest of the 
determinants were not that significative to the model. 
Following this introduction, Chapter 1 presents literature review with 
theories regarding capital structure and the description of the capital structure 
determinants. Chapter 2 presents the US Financial crisis, the European 
Sovereign Debt crisis and the economic environment of the two countries in 
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study; Chapter 3 is the Methodology chapter presenting the sample, 
econometric model and variables description; Chapter 4 develops the 
preliminary analysis of the data and the regression results. The conclusion 
closes the study. 
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Chapter 1 
Capital Structure  
 
Different theories are debated in Literature review in what concerns capital 
structure since the beginning of its discussion. Financial decisions as to new 
investments and the way to finance them are made by firms based on their 
capital structure. Theories from Durand (1952) and Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) – Propositions I and II - are presented aligned with corrected theories 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). The Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories are 
also highlighted in this chapter, along with Asymmetry of Information and the 
Agency Theory. 
 
 
1. Theories of Capital Structure 
 
1.1. Traditional View and Irrelevance Theory 
 
David Durand was the first to discuss capital structure, in 1952. Durand 
(1952) developed the traditional theory of capital structure where he believed in 
the existence of an optimal capital structure that maximized a firm’s value. He 
also proved that equity’s value should never be lower than debt’s value. To get 
the optimal capital structure, firms would tend to increase debt until the 
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weighted average cost of capital (WACC 1) was at its minimum. Otherwise, debt 
would increase leading the firm to bankruptcy. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) are key authors in the capital structure subject, 
launching the idea of capital structure irrelevance. Two propositions were 
made, regarding capital structure, based on perfect market assumptions. These 
assumptions were: i) no transactions costs, ii) no bankruptcy costs, iii) no taxes, 
iv) inexistence of asymmetry of information, v) no agency costs, vi) full 
competition and vii) no arbitrage opportunities. In one hand, Proposition I is 
about the amount of debt in firm value. In perfect market conditions, firms in 
the same type of business would have the same value. On the other hand, 
Proposition II addresses the direct relationship between cost of equity and debt 
ratio. For the WACC to remain constant, debt and equity must increase 
accordingly. 
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller corrected their 1958 model. As, in the real 
world, there are no perfect markets, the authors added corporate taxes to the 
model and found that firm value increases when leverage increases, due to tax 
deductibility of debt. Thus, capital structure now influences the firm’s value, 
meaning that the optimal capital structure is reached by maximizing the firm’s 
debt level. 
 
1.2. Trade-Off Theory  
The Trade-Off Theory identifies an optimal financial leverage in the trade-off 
between benefits from debt and business risks. This theory was devised by 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), who argued that as interest tax shields are 
deductible, the firm will choose to finance itself using debt to profit from tax 
benefits. However, the firm must be able to pay its debt liabilities, or it will face 
                                                 
1 The WACC is a calculation of the firm’s cost of capital where the quantities of equity and debt are weighted 
having in mind the cost of equity and the cost of debt. 
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significant bankruptcy penalties. Optimal capital structure is determined by the 
level of debt that maximizes the firm’s value without taking the firm to 
bankruptcy – which clearly means that debt policy is not irrelevant to the 
capital structure.  
This theory shows that the benefits of tax shields and costs associated to debt 
must be balanced to reach an optimal capital structure. It also implies an 
optimal ratio for  firms and indicates a path to achieve it. 
More profitable firms with more tangible assets have, according to the 
authors, higher debt ratios when compared to firms with no profits, with risky 
assets and more intangible assets. The authors also support the idea that debt is 
healthy since it increases tax-shields. However, it originates costs related to 
agency problems, known as agency costs, and it can lead to a possible situation 
of firm bankruptcy, adding bankruptcy costs to the equation. The probability of 
firm bankruptcy increases in the same proportion as indebtedness.  
The Trade-Off Theory is discussed as dynamic and static. The dynamic 
Trade-Off theory gives importance to time, to future expectations and to 
transaction costs deriving from funding. This transaction costs join bankruptcy 
costs and tax-shields. The way to finance new investments depends on what is 
better for the firm in the future, since it will have to choose between distribution 
and raising of funds.  
The static Trade-Off Theory got its first approach by Myers (1977) and then 
Bradley et. al (1984), and searches for an optimal capital structure resulting 
from market imperfections. Agency costs of financial distress and tax 
deductibility of debt finance - two market frictions - can generate an optimal 
capital structure (Chirinko and Singha, 2000). Firm’s optimal debt ratio is 
determined by a trade-off of the costs and benefits of borrowing, keeping 
constancy in the firms’ assets. There is the need to balance the value of interest 
tax-shields against the cost of bankruptcy or financial embarrassment. Firms 
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can substitute equity for debt and debt for equity up to the maximum firm’s 
value (Myers, 1984).  
Myers (1984) advocated that when the firm’s debt increases, so does risk, but 
this is balanced by debt tax-shields. He also argues that firms increase their debt 
levels until the point where the benefits of indebting equal the possible 
bankruptcy and agency costs (Myers, 2001). 
Fama and French (2002) discussed the benefits and costs of debt. The benefits 
are the tax deductibility of interest and the reduction of free cash flow (FCF) 
problems - given that, by issuing debt, the firm is committed to pay debtholders 
and has less cash available for managers to use in perquisites, reducing 
available FCF. Costs include potential bankruptcy costs and potential agency 
conflicts between stockholders and bondholders. The authors argue that the 
balance between costs and benefits of debt leads to an optimal capital structure 
– at leverage optimum, the benefit of the last dollar of debt offsets the cost. It is 
possible to achieve an optimal capital structure by balancing debt’s costs – 
bankruptcy and agency costs – with debt’s benefits – tax deductibility of 
interests and reduction of free cash flow problem. Potential bankruptcy costs 
decrease firms’ target leverage and agency costs of free cash flow increases 
firms’ target leverage (Fama and French, 2002). 
 
1.3. Pecking Order Theory and Asymmetry of 
Information 
The Pecking Order Theory, developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984), suggests several different sources of financing so that firms can 
choose depending on each source’s costs. The fundamental friction of this 
theory is the information asymmetry between managers and less-informed 
third-party investors. Within this theory, there is no optimal target for debt-to-
equity ratio and, consequently, there is no optimal capital structure. The theory 
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defends that the firm reaches its maximum value because of the decision-
making process, considering financing choices. Myers (1984) refers a hierarchy 
where firms prefer internal financing and adapt their target dividend payout 
ratio to their investment opportunities. If the need to raise external funds arises, 
firms must issue safe securities first, then issue hybrid securities (such as 
convertible bonds), and, as a last resort, issue equity bonds. According to 
internal resources of each firm, its capital structure and indebtedness level will 
be different between firms. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) claim 
that firms follow this hierarchy of preference of internal over external and debt 
over equity, due to asymmetric information and problem identification 
associated with the choice of external funds. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) state that “the strong performance of the 
pecking order does not occur just because firms fund unanticipated cash needs with debt 
in the short-run”. Their empirical results show that firms plan to finance 
anticipated deficits with debt. When a firm’s internal cash flows are unsuitable 
for its investment and dividend commitments, the firm issues debt. These 
authors tested the Pecking Order theory against the Trade-Off theory resulting 
that the first has more statistical power than the last. 
The capital structure is also influenced by the information asymmetry that 
occurs mostly between managers and shareholders. Managers have a deeper 
knowledge of the firm than shareholders, and the last ones tend to be 
misinformed about the business and the market, about the current situation of 
the firm and about the business risks. Myers and Majluf (1984) studies showed 
that, if investors are less informed than actual firm insiders on firm’s assets 
value, then equity may be mispriced by the market. In consequence and, 
seldomly, the firm may even consider passing a positive Net Present Value2  
(NPV) project if this project needs financing from equity issue. The 
                                                 
2 Net Present Value – used in investments budgeting, it is the difference between value of present cash inflows 
and the present value of cash outflows. For example, a positive NPV project means that the future earnings of 
the investment are higher than its costs.  
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underpricing of equity may be so severe that new investors, the ones that buy 
new equity shares issued, may capture more than the new project NPV, which 
results in a net loss to existing shareholders (Myers, 1984 and Myers and Majluf, 
1984 cit in Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
In this theory’s simple approach, debt typically grows when investment 
exceeds retained earnings and reduces when investment is inferior to retained 
earnings (Fama and French, 2002). 
 
1.4. Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) referred that the agency relationship was one 
that joined two agents under a contract – where one or more individuals, 
known as principal, employ someone, the agent, to whom they shall delegate 
the power for decision-making purpose (Silva and Pinto, 2018). It can exist 
between a manager and a shareholder or an equity holder and a debt holder. 
Given that the manager has its own goal when managing the firm, there is 
always a conflict of interest. What the manager wants is not necessarily the 
same the shareholder seeks - their goals might be different. The manager wishes 
to maximize the firm’s profit without considering the shareholders’ interests; 
and shareholders want the manager to pay out cash and not investing it. Free 
cash flow is costly because of this conflict between managers and shareholders. 
On the one hand, managers wish to retain cash-flows to invest them in projects 
that will enhance their reputation, power, and compensation. On the other 
hand, shareholders want managers to pay out cash-flows as dividends, because 
the projects mentioned above have a negative NPV (Heaton, 2002). The attempt 
of diminishing these conflicts generates agency costs. 
Managers hold less than 100% of the residual claim, meaning that if the firm 
performs well they earn part of the profit and can consume the perquisites. If 
the firm performs badly and they do not make any effort to manage it, they will 
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bear 100% of the costs. As a result, managers tend to waste free cash-flow - 
excess cash - on perquisites, benefiting themselves. This inefficiency and 
conflict of interests, and consequent agency costs, can be reduced by increasing 
the equity fraction owned by the manager. The bigger this fraction, the more 
effort the manager will engage in managing the firm, since he will want the 
firm and its shares to hold the highest possible value. Plus, when the firm issues 
debt it makes the commitment of paying out cash to creditors. Dividends also 
help to control this problem and reduce this agency costs by forcing managers 
to pay out more of firm’s excess cash instead of wasting it on personal benefits 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986)). This will 
reduce the excess cash for managers self-use, in the perquisites. It can be 
concluded that one of the benefits of issuing debt is the reduction of conflict of 
interests. 
 
2. Capital Structure Determinants 
 
In this chapter, as shown relevant in the literature, we present the capital 
structure determinants that will be essential for the development of this thesis. 
We included Profitability, Firm Size, Tangibility – Nature of Assets, Growth 
Opportunities, Non-debt Tax Shields, Uniqueness and Tax Rate. 
 
 
2.1. Profitability 
 
Profitability allows the researchers to evaluate if the firm resources are being 
used efficiently and intends to measure the ability of the firm to generate 
profits. It can be defined as the entity’s gains as opposed to the entity’s value. 
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Frank and Goyal (2009) defended that profitable firms were the ones with 
lower bankruptcy costs and, thus, more ability for debt use. Furthermore, these 
types of firms place more relevance in tax-shields.  
As per the Trade-Off theory, there should be a positive relationship between 
leverage and profitability. 
Ozkan (2001) defends a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage referring that it is explained by the Pecking Order theory. This theory 
refers that more profitable firms tend to resort less to debt. This happens 
because, as they follow possible sources of financing hierarchy, they choose 
internal funds’ finance first. When firms choose to use internal funds, this 
means that the amount of external funds is small, and consequently the amount 
of leverage is also small. Moreover, firms with higher levels of profitability tend 
to easily generate funds - meaning that these firms can finance themselves 
effortlessly - having a lower level of indebtedness. According to this theory, 
there is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
Some authors, like Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Harris and Raviv (1991) 
establish that profitability and leverage are negatively correlated.  
Titman and Wessels (1988) also believe in a negative relationship. They 
indicate that more profitable firms have better access to debt than less profitable 
firms. However, the latter reach more for debt because they tend to have more 
important financial problems. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen 
(1986), firms with more assets in place use a bigger fraction of their pre-
earnings interest to pay debt and dividends, controlling agency costs derived 
from the free cash-flow. Controlling for investment opportunities, the dividend 
payout and leverage are positively correlated with profitability (Fama and 
French, 2002). 
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Jensen (1986) argues that in the event of a financial crisis, more profitable 
firms are the ones that have less difficulties in supporting possible costs that 
might arise from the crisis because of cash-flow availability. 
As per all the above-established relationships, we present here the 
hypothesis that it is expected a negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability. 
In 2007/2008, the US government stated in report3 from 2012 that the GDP of 
the United States declined deeply. A low GDP means less expenditures and less 
consumption, leading to firms selling less, having lower profitability. Also, as 
the stock market reacted to the financial crisis, the stock’s prices declined. And, 
since the stock market is related to the profitability of a firm – firms have an 
incentive to present profits if they exist so that their shares become more 
attractive to investors (Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 2006) - a decline in the stock 
market reflects a decline in profitability. The level of profitability gives 
investors a greater certainty as to the firm they want to invest in. In times of 
crisis, profitability is even more important because investors will put their 
money on  firms that they believe will not default their payments. 
 
2.2. Firm Size 
 
The Pecking Order Theory defends that size is one of the factors that gives 
exposure and visibility to the firm in financial markets, next to investors and 
creditors, diminishing the possibility of information asymmetry. Since small 
firms have to pay more to issue equity and have less access or a not so easy 
access to external funds, these firms will use more of their internal funds, 
reflecting a positive correlation between firm size and leverage (Silva and Pinto, 
2018). 
                                                 
3 Economic report of the president. (Advisers, C.O.E, 2012, Washington, US). 
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Defenders of the Trade-Off Theory also find evidence that size and leverage 
are positively correlated. Frank and Goyal (2009), for example, state that large 
and more diversified firms face lower default risk, and older firms with better 
reputation in the debt market face lower debt-related agency costs – leading to 
the same conclusion as the theory – larger and more mature firms have more 
debt. This occurs because bigger firms are more diversified and have more 
stable cash-flows. Their bankruptcy costs are smaller relatively to the firm value 
and they have easier access to credit from financial institutions with low 
interest rates, once their level of default is lower and their negotiating power is 
higher. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Harris and Raviv 
(1991) agree with the Trade-Off Theory, referring that it is expected that bigger 
firms are more diversified, and consequently less likely to fail and bankrupt, 
which means they can borrow more, increasing the debt levels. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) allege that the Agency Theory also indicates a 
positive relation between size and leverage. This happens because they believe 
that large firms are more complex and less transparent, bearing more agency 
costs, than small firms - which are easier to monitor. In a large firm, the 
monitoring of managers would increase monitor and bonding costs. A possible 
and feasible solution to avoid all these costs is to issue debt, as when a firm 
issues debt, managers are controlled by third-parties (Ibrahimo and Barros, 
2009). There is another indication that the relationship between size and 
leverage is positive, as bigger firms decide to borrow more to control managers’ 
behavior. 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is expected a positive correlation between 
firm size and leverage, as it was encountered in Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) researches. 
Berg and Kirschenman (2010) believed that financial crisis had impact on 
firms as to their sizes. Credit availability depends on the firm’s size, therefore 
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when banks suffered the lack of equity during the financial crisis, they had less 
credit and paid more attention to firms to which they would issue loans. They 
would prefer larger firms to ensure that they would receive their money back. 
 
 
2.3. Tangibility – Nature of Assets  
 
Tangible assets are easier to quantify and easily valued by third-parties 
leading to less information asymmetry, meaning less financial distress (Frank 
and Goyal, 2009). In case of the firm’s liquidation or bankruptcy, tangible assets 
can be given or sold to creditors to reduce bankruptcy costs. Also, tangible 
assets can be used as collateral on a loan; they can be given as a guarantee that 
the firm will pay the loan. Hence, the relationship established between 
tangibility and leverage is positive. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) assert that less tangible firms have more problems 
of information asymmetry and cannot give guarantees to its creditors. 
Therefore, creditors are more willing to grant credit to firms with more tangible 
assets as they can give those assets as collateral. Firms with more tangible assets 
resort more to debt, since they can give assets as assurance, and profit from this 
opportunity. The relationship between tangibility and leverage is positive. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) agree with Myers and Majluf (1984) since they claim 
that debt is easily reached by firms with more tangible assets because this type 
of firms have less agency problems – also showing that the relationship is 
positive. 
The Trade-Off theory reaches the same conclusion as the authors mentioned 
above. 
Frank and Goyal (2009) show that, as to tangibility, the Pecking Order theory 
reveals an ambiguity issue. When a firm faces low information asymmetry 
associated to its tangible assets, it tends to issue equity, because it is less costly – 
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meaning that a firm with more tangible assets should have inferior debt levels 
(inverse relationship). However, tangibility increases the adverse selection 4  
about assets in place resulting in a higher leverage level. 
Due to the convergence of opinions, the hypothesis presented is a positive 
relationship between tangibility and leverage is expected in this paper. 
With the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the banks suffered the lack of liquidity 
already mentioned above. This meant that banks would require more security 
when issuing a loan for a firm (Berg and Kirschenman, 2010). Besides, investors 
prefer to invest in a firm that has assets to use as collateral in case something 
goes wrong. In times of crisis, tangibility is an important aspect. 
 
 
2.4. Growth Opportunities 
 
The Trade-Off model predicts that, when controlling the profitability of 
assets in place, firms with more investments have less leverage. This happens 
for two reasons (Fama and French, 2002): 
(1) This type of firms has more incentives to avoid underinvestment and 
asset substitution inefficiencies that can arise from stockholder – 
bondholder problems; 
(2) Firms have less needs for discipline of debt payments to control free 
cash-flow problems. 
It can be concluded that there is an inverse relationship between growth and 
leverage, given the above explanations and having in consideration that firms 
with more growth opportunities tend to preserve their debt capacity to future 
                                                 
4 Adverse selection, in the market place, generally refers to a situation where the sellers of financial products 
have information that the buyers do not have. For example, a firm’s manager may be more willing to issue 
shares knowing that they are overvalued as to their real value. This may lead the investor to buy overvalued 
shares, losing money. 
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moments, giving priority to internal funds and choosing them in the present as 
source of financing their investments. 
Frank and Goyal (2009) defend that growth reduces free cash-flow problems, 
increases costs associated to financial difficulties and aggravates agency 
problems related to debt.  
Frank and Goyal (2009) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) reached the 
conclusion that there is an inverse relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities.  
Due to information asymmetry, firms with higher leverage levels tend to 
miss investment opportunities. Firms with more growth opportunities tend to 
have lower levels of leverage (Miller, 1977). This means there is a negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Empirical research of Titman and Wessels (1988) indicate a negative 
relationship between growth and leverage. Growing firms have more flexibility 
to choose in which project to invest and, according to the Pecking Order theory, 
they choose first to finance with internal funds. This means that growing  firms 
present lower leverage levels. 
The agency theory also concludes about this variable. Managers have more 
freedom to choose how to finance future investments and their choice will be 
the one that maximizes their utility (Titman and Wessels, 1988). To control 
managers’ behavior, the firm may issue debt, and, in this case, monitoring is 
done by outsiders. According to this theory, there is a positive relationship 
between growth opportunities and leverage. 
In agreement with the agency theory and contradicting the rest of opinions, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
leverage and growth opportunities. Firms with less investment opportunities 
tend to rely less in debt than firms with more growth opportunities. This occurs 
because if a firm does not have enough internal funds to seize the investment 
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opportunity, it should use debt as defended by the Pecking Order theory (Silva 
and Pinto, 2018). 
In this thesis, and because it is the prevailing opinion amongst authors, an 
inverse relationship between leverage and growth opportunities is the foreseen 
hypothesis. 
There is less or no growth for several quarters during the financial crisis 
period (Baily and Elliott, 2009) due to the decline of economy. 
 
 
2.5. Non-debt Tax Shields 
 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show in their article that Miller’s irrelevancy 
theorem is sensitive to realistic and simple modification in the corporate tax 
code. The existence of non-debt corporate tax shields such as depreciation 
deductions or investment tax credits is enough to overturn the leverage 
irrelevancy theorem. With bankruptcy, agency, or other costs, each firm will 
have its optimal capital structure whether there are non-debt shields available. 
Since tax deductions for depreciation, investments or R&D expenses are 
alternatives for debt tax shields, firms will select a level of debt negatively 
correlated to the level of available tax shield substitutes for debt (DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980), meaning an inverse relationship. 
Bradley et. al (1984) reached a contrary relationship between NDTS and 
leverage, even though he hoped to reach the same conclusions as DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980). 
Titman and Wessels (1988) cannot find evidence to support the relation 
between leverage and non-debt tax shields as they mentioned that this attribute 
is difficult to measure. 
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2.6. Uniqueness 
 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991) firms with more specialized, unique 
products usually impose higher costs to its customers, suppliers, and workers 
in case of bankruptcy. This happens because customers will find it harder to 
acquire a similar product, suppliers of a specific component are now losing a 
client, and workers with specific skills will have difficulty in finding a new job. 
Firms with unique industries with more specialized labor will incur in high 
financial distress costs and consequently less debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
Since costs imposed on customers when a producer goes bankrupt are higher 
when the production is unique, these types of firms are expected to have less 
leverage. The same findings are supported by Titman and Wessels’ (1988) 
study, stating that in case of a bankruptcy it will be harder for customers to find 
an alternative product. As the probability of bankruptcy increases with the level 
of leverage (Harris and Raviv, 1991), it expected that firms with unique 
products will have less leverage to protect themselves from going bankrupt. 
 
2.7. Tax Rate 
 
In 1958 Modigliani and Miller’s first proposition affirmed that capital 
structure of a firm was not affected by taxes. However, this premise was 
changed by the same authors in 1963, when, in their second proposition, they 
introduced the tax effect, concluding that taxes really had an impact – the value 
of the firm increases with tax benefits brought by leverage. 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) expect a positive relationship between tax rate 
and leverage since firms know that they can obtain more tax benefits from debt 
by increasing its level. 
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Frank and Goyal (2009) defend that high tax rates increase interest tax 
benefits of debt. The Trade-Off theory predicts that to take advantage of higher 
interest tax shields, firms will issue more debt when tax rates are higher. 
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Chapter 2 
Crisis and Capital Structure  
 
 
1. The US Financial Crisis 
 
The critical year of the financial crisis was 2008 even though it started a few 
years back. Starting in the beginning of the century, in 2001, the tech bubble 
came to an end resulting in a long period of low interest rates (Goodhart, 2008). 
With these low interest rates, the banks started to sell new loans, known now as 
subprime mortgages, to higher default probability customers – either individual 
or firms (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996). 
By August 2007, the Federal Reserve System decided to increase interest 
rates, hampering loan pay-back plus interest. These were the mortgage loans 
which had as collateral the client’s houses instead of cash (Kalse, 2008). For this 
reason, housing pricing started to decline and, as a consequence, collateral 
assets were not valuable anymore, starting the housing bust (Taylor, 2009). 
Banks had no certainty at all that they would get back the loans and presented a 
lack of liquidity (Berg and Kirschenman, 2010). Since banks had this lack of 
cash-flow, they depended on Central Banks and third-parties to help them get 
out of the liquidity crisis (Goodhart, 2008). This was one of the reasons that 
transformed this crisis in an international and world-spread crisis, affecting 
other firms. 
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There were other factors that contributed to the escalation of the financial 
crisis - the work of rating agencies and the lack of transparency. The above 
referred loans, subprime mortgages, were new to the market meaning that it 
was difficult for rating agencies to assess the risk associated thereto (Calomiris, 
2008). Besides, a new product was created, Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDO). These structured financial products were determined to take in 
consideration all the resources from a firm or individual with any value, like 
corporate loans or mortgages. Such values were then rearranged into the form 
of bonds and resold to investors. However, the risk of packages, the CDOs, was 
difficult to measure because they were also new to the financial market. Thus, 
rating agencies tended to qualify CDOs with high quality ratings, indicating a 
high reliability of the new financial instrument. The problem was that CDOs 
presented high risk, and their quality rating should be lower (Calomiris, 2008). 
Managers knew about this mistake and sold CDOs anyway, not giving this 
information to investors (Calomiris, 2008).  
Since managers had more information than investors, a problem of 
information asymmetry arose resulting on a lending reduction. Furthermore, 
the parties that lent money to each other were less willing to continue, which 
caused a decline in trust and consequently in liquidity (Calomiris, 2008). 
The beginning date of the financial crisis is still debatable. It might have 
started in the Summer of 2007 when the housing bust took place (Taylor, 2009). 
Or, maybe it started when the market downgraded the rating of the CDOs, in 
2007, and investors stopped buying them, because they were worthless. Also, in 
2007, banks noticed that most of the loans they made were not going to get 
payed back; there was an increase in the number of defaulted payments (Kalse, 
2008). In 2008, took place the famous episode of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy 
that caused the extreme decline of the NYSE in September 2008, since they were 
one of the largest investment banks in the United States of America (McDonald, 
2016). 
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For the purpose of this master thesis, the date of September 15th, 2008 is the 
chosen one for the beginning of the financial crisis. From January 1st, 2000 until 
that day of September 14th, 2008 we considered the pre-crisis period. 
 
 
2. European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
The European Sovereign Debt Crisis started in 2009 and peaked in 2010 until 
2012. Countries from the Euro Zone had difficulties in paying or refinancing 
their debt without the help of third-parties. 
This European Debt crisis was rooted, with high probability, on the financial 
crisis of 2007, when the European Central Bank (ECB) started the liquidity 
operations (Honohan et al., 2010) and in 2008 when one of the largest 
investment banks, Lehman Brothers, immersed the whole financial system in a 
global crisis. The European banks were highly exposed to the losses in assets-
backed securities in the United States market (Lane, 2012). In the beginning of 
2009, this crisis hit Europe as stronger as it reached the United States, following 
the real-estate market crisis and property bubbles. 
The most shocking news originated in Greece (Ardagna and Caselli, 2012), in 
2009, when the Greek government revealed that the previous government had 
grossly reported its budget deficit - it misreported the government budget data.  
Four countries joined Greece in this crisis: Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and 
Cyprus. 
All were unable to repay their government debt. The five countries needed 
help from financial institutions, like ECB, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the European Financial Strategy Stability fund, to avoid payments’ 
default (Silva and Pinto, 2018).  
In the 2003-2007 period, the credit boom was not primarily due to 
government borrowing. For Ireland, the primary borrowers were households, 
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fueling debt accumulation in this country. The Irish government was not a net 
borrower during this period. In Ireland, credit and housing booms directly 
generated extra tax revenues, driving up assets’ prices, construction activity, 
and capital inflows boosted the take from capital gains taxes, asset transaction 
taxes and expenditure taxes (Lane, 2012). Ireland was the most impressive 
example. Due to Ireland’s banking system high dependence on international 
short-term funding, this encouraged the government to provide an extensive 
two-year liability guarantee to its banks at the end of September 2008 (Honohan 
et al., 2010; Lane, 2011). In Portugal, the most significant borrowers were both 
the government and firms, and these negative flows were in part offset by 
significant net accumulation of financial assets by the household sector of the 
country (Lane, 2012). 
The end of the credit boom was especially problematic for Ireland, since the 
construction sectors had grown rapidly. The decline in the construction 
business was a major shock to the Irish economic activity and the decline in 
property prices resulted in severe losses for the Irish banking system (Lane, 
2011). Furthermore, abandoned and falling projects indicated large prospective 
losses for banks that had done too many property-backed loans (Lane, 2012). 
Between Ireland and Portugal, the first country to be shut-out of the bond 
market was Ireland, in November 2010, simultaneously with the bailout 
request. Portugal was the third country5 (Pereira and Wemans, 2015) to be shut-
out of the bond market in April 2011, requesting bailout one month later, in 
May 2011 (Lane, 2012). 
In each of the bailouts performed by Euro-area governments and IMF 
(Ardagna and Caselli, 2012), there were established joint European 
Union/International Monetary Fund (EU/IMF) programs under which a three 
year funding would be provided under the condition that countries who 
received it had to implement fiscal austerity packages and structural reforms to 
                                                 
5 After Greece and Ireland. 
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boost country’s growth - especially in Portugal – and recapitalized and 
deleveraged overextended baking systems – especially important in Ireland. 
The amount needed and required exceeded the IMF normal levels of lending 
money and so, the European Union was one bigger provider for the fund. It 
was also established a temporary European Financial Stability Facility that 
could issue bonds based on guarantees from the member states to provide 
official funding in any future crises (Lane, 2012). 
Details of the funding plans for both Portugal and Ireland largely copied 
standard IMF practices; however, they faced some problems (Lane, 2012): 
- The plausible time-scale for macroeconomic adjustment was longer 
than previously established three years, due to the scale of 
macroeconomic, financial, and fiscal imbalances. However, by June 
2011, it was likely that Ireland and Portugal would not be able to 
obtain full market funding after the expiry of the, at the time, current 
deals. 
- Falls in output production and a rise in taxes diminished households’ 
disposable income and corporate profits. This increased the private 
sector default risk. In Ireland, this was identified as an especially 
strong risk, in view of the scale of household debt. 
- The bailout funds were used to recapitalize banking systems apart 
from covering the “regular” fiscal deficits. This was important in the 
Irish bailout and it was also present in the Portuguese one. 
According to Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2010), the recapitalization of 
troubled banks can ameliorate a banking crisis, but if it raises public debt and 
sovereign risk to an excessive level it is a problematic strategy. 
Since mid-2012, funds provided by the European Financial Stability Facility 
were only enough to address Greece, Ireland, and Portugal’s bailouts, and not 
enough to offer support to Spain and/or Italy (Lane, 2012). 
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For the purpose of this master thesis the period of the European sovereign 
debt crisis is considered to go from April 24th, 2010 until the end of the sample, 
December 31st, 2017. 
 
3. Capital Structure and Financial Crisis – Empirical 
Evidence of determinants’ impact in capital structure 
 
There is prior research done in this area of capital structure determinants and 
its influence in the choice of the leverage level. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated seven developed countries, named in 
the paper as G-76, and concluded that the correlation between leverage and its 
determinants – like firm’s size and profitability – were fairly similar across the 
sample (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004). The authors also found that even though the 
firm-specific determinants influence the capital structure choice, it is also 
influenced by country-specific factors.  
Demirüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) compared capital structure from 
nineteen developed countries and eleven developing countries concluding that 
the portion of long-term debt used was different between developed and 
developing countries. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) found moderate support that firms follow the 
Trade-Off Theory and target their debt ratio but also found support for the 
Pecking Order Theory. Results of this study show that firms’ value financial 
flexibility, but its importance is not related to information asymmetry or growth 
opportunities, as predicted by the Pecking Order Theory. Regarding agency 
costs, signaling, asset substitution, free cash-flow and product market concerns, 
little evidence was found by the authors that all these factors have influence in 
the capital structure choice (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004). 
                                                 
6 United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Canada. 
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The Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo’s (2004) studies 
showed evidence that financing policies and management behavior were 
influenced by institutional environment and international operations when 
studying developed economies like the U.S. and European (De Jong, Kabir and 
Nguyen, 2007). 
By studying firms’ capital structure from developed and developing 
countries, Booth et al. (2001) found that they were affected by the same firm-
specific factors. However, it was also found that country-specific factors such as 
GDP growth and capital market development also affected the leverage chosen 
level (De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2007). The same study allowed observing 
that the capital structure of firms is usually explained by variables that arise out 
of static Trade-Off Theory, agency, and information asymmetry considerations 
(Bancel and Mitto, 2004). 
Among several prior studies on international capital structures [see for e.g. 
Booth et al. (2001), Fan et al. (2012)] there is the assumption that the impact of 
firm-specific factors is the same irrespective of the country. However, it is 
acknowledged that the impact of these firm-level determinants varies in terms 
of signs, magnitudes, and significance levels (De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 
2007). 
The French, German and British firms were already object of study by 
Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2002) regarding the determinants of capital 
structure – firm-specific. They investigated the leverage ratios of firms within 
these three countries with different financial systems and traditions that have 
influence in the way that firms choose their capital structure. As expected by 
the authors, the effects of the determinants in the study were country-specific. 
These country-specific factors play an important role on how quickly firms 
need to adjust their debt-equity position to achieve their optimal leverage level. 
They concluded that capital structure does not only depend on firm’s own 
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characteristics but also depends on the environment where the firm is involved 
and the traditions with which it operates. 
In a study about capital structure determinants focused on cross-country 
comparisons of managerial behavior using a sample of sixteen countries, Bancel 
and Mittoo (2004) found that there are several consistencies with the Trade-Off 
Theory since firm managers’ care about tax deductibility of interest, volatility 
earnings and the potential bankruptcy costs. Also, most of the managers in the 
survey tried to minimize WACC, others admitted they issue debt when interest 
rates are low or when firm’s equity is undervalued – suggesting that managers 
use opportunity windows to raise capital. The results show that most firms 
determine their capital structure by trading-off factors like tax advantages of 
debt or bankruptcy costs, agency costs and accessibility to external financing 
(Bancel and Mittoo, 2004). Consistent with the Trade-Off Theory, managers 
reveal that there is target debt ratio to achieve. Contrary to the Pecking Order 
Theory, managers answered the survey saying that when there are insufficient 
profits to finance new investments, they tend to issue equity (Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004). Strengthening evidence from Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1998), related debt factors are more influenced by the country’s 
institutional structure, especially the quality of its legal system (Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004). 
De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) analyzed firm size, asset tangibility, 
profitability, firm risk and growth opportunities as leverage determinants, 
finding that the impact of these factors was strong and consistent with capital 
structure theories. Even though theories of capital structure use US listed firms 
as role model, the authors find that it works well in similar economies with 
developed legal environment and high level of economic development. They 
find that in countries with a better law enforcement system and a healthier 
economy, firms are not likely to take more debt, but the effects of some firm-
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level determinants of leverage such as growth opportunities, profitability, and 
liquidity are reinforced.  
In addition to the sole study of capital structure determinants, several 
authors wanted to see their influence in capital structure choice in three 
different periods: before, during and after the 2008 financial crisis in the US. 
The 2008 financial crisis gives the opportunity to see how a financial shock 
impacts on firms’ capital structure (Harrison and Widjaja, 2014). Knowing that 
there is a possibility of a rare and random economic crisis, firms are more 
conservative about their financial policy (Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev, 
2010). Also, for financially distressed firms, the velocity of adjustment of their 
capital structure is low (Ariff, Taufiq, and Shamsher, 2008). 
Campello et al. (2010) surveyed 1050 CFOs from firms in the US, Europe, and 
Asia to assess whether their firms were credit restrained during the financial 
crisis, in 2008. They conclude that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech 
spending, marketing, employment, and capital spending. Also, these firms had 
to resort to their savings and had to sell assets to fund new investment 
opportunities. In fact, numerous firms had to pass attractive investment 
opportunities due to borrowing incapability. Campello et al. (2010) also reached 
the conclusion that during the financial crisis, growth opportunities for many 
firms were affected negatively since it became harder to acquire external 
funding. 
Proença, Laureano and Laureano (2014) investigated capital structure 
determinants using Portuguese SMEs and examined the effects of the financial 
crisis of 2008 on the capital structure of the same firms. Liquidity, asset 
structure and profitability were considered the most important determinants 
since they were the ones with more impact. The negative relationship 
established between debt ratios and profitability suggests that Portuguese 
SMEs have a preference for financing their investment opportunities with 
internal funds rather than using external financing – which is in line with the 
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Pecking Order Theory. In parallel with the Trade-Off Theory, the authors 
reached the conclusion that firms with high levels of tangible assets are 
expected to issue more debt because this kind of assets can be used as collateral 
in case of firm bankruptcy. 
Iqbal and Kume (2014) examined the impact of financial crisis on the capital 
structure of listed, non-financial and non-utility firms from the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany. They used as determinants tangibility, firm 
size, market value to book value, growth opportunities and business risk 
among others. Results from this study showed that leverage ratio increased 
from pre-crisis (2006-2007) to crisis period (2008-2009) and decreased post-crisis 
(2010-2011). As to debt and equity, both their levels changed during the crisis 
and post-crisis years. 
Harrison and Widjaja (2014) did a comparative study of capital structure 
between two periods: before and after the financial crisis of 2008. Their sample 
is constituted by non-financial and non-utility firms listed in the US SandP 500 
index. The determinants studied are tangibility, profitability, size, market to 
book ratio and liquidity. Results show that the coefficient of tangibility and 
market-to-book ratio have a stronger influence in capital structure choice 
during the 2008 financial crisis than prior to 2008. Also, profitability coefficient 
seems to have less influence in capital structure choice before the crisis. Firm 
size coefficient has changed signs, being positive before and negative in the 
crisis period. Firm size’s coefficient decreases drastically between 2004-2007 – 
the pre-crisis period – and 2008-2011 - the post-crisis period. Harrison and 
Widjaja (2014) argue that the justification for this last coefficient is that lenders 
might have looked for lower adverse selection during financial crisis. 
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4. Economic crisis in Portugal and Ireland 
 
In order to reach some conclusions regarding firms’ performance, we should 
first understand the economic situation of the countries where these firms are 
established, Portugal and Ireland. For the purpose of comprehension, a 
discussion of the following macroeconomic factors is presented: Population, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP Growth Rate, Public Debt, 
Unemployment Rate, Tax Rate, GDP Per Capita, Company Tax Rate, 
Productivity, Bank Loans Tax Rate, Imports and Exports. 
From 2000 onwards, Portugal’s economy has slow growth, a rising current 
amount deficit and indebtedness as main characteristics. It is known that for 
crisis recovery, the government had to instore austerity measures as agreed 
with the European Council. This happened in March 2010 when the Stability 
and Growth Program was adopted. As this austerity package was not enough, 
two more followed in May and in October of the same year. 
The Portuguese government negotiated with troika7 the Memorandum of 
Understanding where austerity and adjustment rules or policies were 
established to reduce government indebtedness, deficit and rebalance the 
accounts by cutting on people’s wages (Caldas, 2012). 
The reduction of the government deficit was made through increases in tax 
and cuts in spending. For example, some of the main taxes that were risen are 
employees’ contributions to public pension funds and increasing income tax 
rates, among others. The principal cuts in spending embrace wage cuts in 
higher pensions and cuts on wages in the public administration. 
Ireland’s economy was completely shaken up by crisis in 2008, as before this 
surprise, the country was living an extraordinary economic era – the Celtic 
                                                 
7 Troika is the name given to a group of 3 members: International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and 
European Commission. 
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Tiger. Since 2008, there has been an incredible and unbelievable growth in 
government indebtedness as Ireland became one of the more heavily indebted 
economies. This is the result of the property bubble breakdown that occurred 
between 2001 and 2007 as the government destroyed all that had been built in 
the past, leading to the implosion of the Irish banking system. The property 
bubble issue along with the rising of unemployment rate turned it impossible 
for many people to pay their bank loans. In 2010, as Ireland was quickly 
increasing the debt ratio and had the highest deficit in the Euro Zone, it entered 
in a  European Union and the International Monetary Fund support program, 
and was, consequently, locked out of the bond market (Rigney, 2012). As of 
2008, Irish domestic demand decreased rapidly with the introduction of the five 
anti-crisis budgets to attempt to correct public finances with the help of 
consolidation measures (Smyth, 2017). 
Below is presented a graphic view of the Portuguese and Irish economies 
and their evolution during the analyzed periods. 
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4.1.  Population 
 
The population from both countries was growing during the pre-financial 
crisis period. Between 2008 and 2010, both countries had its population 
growing. In Ireland, the population continued to grow after the financial crisis 
period, during the European sovereign debt crisis years; however, the 
Portuguese population decreased from almost 10,6 million of people to 10,3 
million.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Population Graphs for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
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4.2. Gross Domestic Product 
 
In the pre-financial crisis period both countries’ GDP were growing during 
those 8 years. When confronted with the repercussions from the US financial 
crisis, both Ireland and Portugal had their GDP decreasing, with Ireland 
presenting a bigger drop than Portugal. During the European sovereign debt 
crisis, it is possible to see that even though Ireland suffered a bigger drop in 
GDP, it has rebound better than the Portuguese community. Besides this, the 
path of recovering GDP values was more constant to Ireland than Portugal and 
Ireland achieved a higher value in 2017 – after the crisis - than the one it had in 
2007 – before the crisis. 
Between 2000 and 2007, Portuguese GDP increased at an annual average rate 
of 1.4% (Caldas, 2012). 
Figure 2 - GDP graphs for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
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4.3. GDP Growth Rate 
 
Analyzing the graphics, it is clear to see that during the financial crisis 
period, in Portugal the value of the rate was mostly negative, reaching the -2.3% 
in 2009; in Ireland, values were also negative reaching -3.8%. In the last period 
of the time sample, Portuguese growth rate was mostly positive from 2014 
onwards; Irish GDP growth rate reached the higher value of all of the sample in 
this same period. 
 
Figure 3 - GDP Growth rate for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
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4.4. Public Debt 
 
Here we have each country public debt as a percentage of the GDP. 
Comparing both countries in the pre-crisis period, we can see that Portugal 
already had a high percentage of GDP as public debt –Portuguese public debt 
in 2000 was half of Portuguese GDP and it only increased since then. Irish 
public debt was always lower than the Portuguese one, and when it increased 
in the financial crisis period it was still lower than the Portuguese one. The 
highest levels of public debt in Ireland and Portugal were during the European 
sovereign debt crisis, where each country reached a maximum of 119.6% and 
130.6%, respectively. In this last period, we can see that both countries 
borrowed more money; however, Ireland has been decreasing the amount of its 
public debt.  
Portuguese GDP increased from 50.4%, in 2000, to 68.3% in 2007 and 107.8% 
in 2011 (Caldas, 2012). 
Figure 4 - Public Debt for Portugal and Ireland 2000-2017 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
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4.5. Unemployment Rate 
 
During the 17 years of the sample, the pattern of unemployment rate is very 
similar. The Portuguese unemployment rate kept increasing since 2000, were it 
was 4.5%, reaching 8.5% in 2008 and 15.6% in the first quarter of 2011 (Caldas, 
2012). Portugal reaches its higher value in 2013, almost 18%, and Ireland 
reaches 12%, its maximum, in 2012. Both countries achieve these values during 
the European sovereign debt crisis period. As expected, during the financial 
crisis period, unemployment rate increased in both countries: in Portugal, it 
went from 7.6% to 10.6% - increasing 3 percentage points – and, in Ireland, it 
went from 7.9% to 13.9% - increasing 6 percentage points. Ireland was between 
the five countries where unemployment rate doubled during this period. 
(Rigney, 2012). Between 2010 and 2017, we can see that both countries 
presented a good recovery since both reached a value inferior to the one they 
had in the pre-crisis period. 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
 Figure 5 - Unemployment Rate for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
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4.6. Interest Tax Rate 
 
Since Portugal and Ireland are members of the European Union and both 
countries’ currency is the Euro, what we see in the above graphs is normal : the 
pattern of interest tax rate is the same for both countries over all the sample 
period. The interest rate payment is part of the refinancing and refunding plans 
that both Portugal and Ireland had to ask for in order to no enter bankruptcy. 
 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
 Figure 6 - Tax Rate for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
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4.7. GDP Per Capita 
 
By the analysis of the three graphs we can see that the Irish GDP per capita 
doubles the Portuguese one since the beginning of the time sample. We can see 
that in the financial crisis period there is a little drop in both countries’ GDP per 
capita, but, in Portugal, it is not as significant as the drop in 2013 during the 
European sovereign debt crisis period. From 2014 forward, in both countries, 
GDP per capita starts to increase until the end of the time sample, being the 
Irish one twice as much as the Portuguese. In the pre-crisis period, with Ireland 
having half of the Portuguese population but double of the GDP per capita, this 
is already an indicator that Ireland has higher probabilities of recovering from a 
financial crisis. 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
 Figure 7 - GDP Per Capita for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
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4.8. Corporate Tax Rate 
 
Looking through these graphs, it can be concluded that firms’ taxes have 
been decreasing over the time sample, these taxes being lower in Ireland than in 
Portugal. Also, in Ireland, tax value is the same since 2004, meaning that value 
has stabilized way before the financial crisis period and it was kept constant 
during both financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis periods. We can 
see that during the financial crisis period the Portuguese one was constant and 
doubled the Irish one once again. As Irish tax kept constant in the European 
sovereign debt period, the Portuguese values suffered some changes reaching a 
lower value than before both crisis period. 
 
Figure 8 - Corporate Tax Rate for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
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4.9. Productivity 
 
Ireland’s productivity increased during all the time sample, being lower in 
the financial crisis period when compared to the European sovereign debt crisis 
period but higher than the period before the financial crisis. In Portugal, we can 
see that productivity suffered some fluctuations during both the financial crisis 
and European sovereign debt crisis periods. Both countries achieve their 
maximum productivity during the period of sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
 Figure 9 - Productivity for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
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4.10. Bank Loans Interest Rates 
 
According to the source, this bank lending rate is for Portugal the average 
interest rate charged on loans given to private individuals and companies by 
commercial banks. For Ireland, it is the interest rate charged for short-term 
borrowings made by large commercial customers. 
It can be seen that in Portugal, bank loans rate was the highest during the 
financial crisis period, decreasing in 2010, but increasing again in the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis period. In Ireland, the taxes reached almost the 6% in the 
financial crisis era, and had a big drop in 2010. During the first years of the 
European Sovereign debt crisis, taxes increased again but stayed at half the 
value they were between 2008-2010.  
 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
 Figure 10 - Bank Loans Tax Rate for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
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4.11. Imports 
 
Looking into the trend line presented in all graphics, imports were affected 
in both countries during the financial crisis period. This is totally expected since 
during difficult times it is normal to avoid spending money. Before the financial 
crisis both countries were following a good path regarding imports.  In 
Portugal, there is bigger break in 2009, recovering from 2010 onwards, even 
though presenting some oscillations during the European Sovereign Debt crisis. 
Around 2009, there was also a break in Irish’s imports. Ireland started to 
recover from this fall shortly after the financial crisis period. The value of Irish’s 
exports reached its maximum in 2017. 
 
Figure 11 - Importations for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
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4.12. Exports 
 
Comparing both countries’ exports during the financial crisis periods, 
Ireland was more affected than Portugal, as the Irish trend line presents a 
higher negative slope than the Portuguese one. Portuguese exports presented a 
big drop between 2008/2009, recovering immediately after that and keeping 
increasing during the remaining years of the time sample. The value of 
Ireland’s exports was constant in the pre-crisis period, as can be seen with the 
trend line. During the European Sovereign Debt crisis, value of Irish exports 
kept increasing with the correct oscillations. 
The performance of the export sector cannot be taken for granted taking in 
account international economic developments – the export sector alone cannot 
make miracles when a country is trying to recover from a period of crisis 
(Rigney, 2012). 
Figure 12 - Exportations for Portugal and Ireland between 2000-2017 
Source: Trading Economics (2019a; 2019b) 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology  
 
The objective of the study is to analyze the impact of the United States 
financial crisis, with its peak in 2008, on the capital structure of Portuguese and 
Irish listed firms. Also, we are going to analyze the impact of the European 
Sovereign Debt crisis over the same aspect of the firms being studied. In this 
chapter, the description of the sample and variables used to get the answer to 
the research question are detailed. 
 
1. Sample 
 
The sample of this empirical study is composed by 672 firms and was 
collected from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. There are two types of 
firms within the two countries in study – the active - listed as “research” in the 
database - and the inactive firms – listed as “dead”. There are 293 “dead” and 
51 “research” Portuguese firms and 275 “dead” and 54 “research” Irish firms, 
giving a total of 672 firms.  
This sample will be analyzed through three different periods in time, in a 
total of 18 years: 
- Pre-financial crisis in the US: from 01-01-2000 until 14-09-2008; 
- The US financial crisis period: from 15-09-2008 until 23-04-2010; 
- The period of the European Sovereign debt crisis: from 24-04-2010 
until 31-12-2017. 
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Since data retrieved from the database is annual, the periods for empirical 
statistics will be the following: 
- Pre-financial crisis in the US: from 2000 until 2007; 
- The US financial crisis period: from 2008-2010; 
- The period of the European Sovereign debt crisis: from 2011 until 
2017. 
 
2. Econometric Model 
 
In this subchapter, the econometric model presented is going to be used to 
find the answers of the research question “What was the impact of the US 
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis on the Portuguese and Irish 
listed firms’ capital structure?”. We will also use panel data methodology, as 
mentioned before, to examine the theoretical hypothesis. Taking these in 
account, the model is presented: 
 
Leverage i,t = β0 + β1 PROFIT i,t + β2 SIZE i,t + β3 TANG i,t + β4 NDTS i,t +  
β5 UNIQ i,t + β6 TAXR i,t + α i + ε i,t 
 
Where: 
• Leverage i,t = Dependent variable, of firm i on the year t; 
• PROFIT i,t = Profitability of firm i on the year t; 
• SIZE i,t = Size of firm i on the year t; 
• TANG i,t = Tangibility of firm i on the year t; 
• NDTS i,t = Non-debt tax shields of firm i on the year t;  
• UNIQ i,t = Uniqueness of firm i on the year t; 
• TAXR i,t = Tax rate paid by firm i on year t;  
• α i = unobserved fixed firm-specific effect;  
• ε i,t = random error of firm i on year t. 
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3. Variables Description 
 
The dependent and independent variables are presented in the next section, 
as well as the proxies used, and the impact expected of the independent 
variables on the dependent one. 
 
 
3.1.  Dependent Variable 
As we want to ascertain the impact of the financial crisis in the firms’ capital 
structure, the dependent variable is leverage. In line with literature, it is 
necessary to define what leverage is, since there are several classifications 
(Frank and Goyal, 2009).  For the purpose of this thesis, leverage will be 
measured as the ratio between total debt and market value of assets. 
 
 
3.2. Independent Variables 
 
The Profitability variable is defined as the ratio between EBITDA and Total 
Assets. Authors like Frank and Goyal (2009) and Titman and Wessels (1988) use 
this ratio to establish a relationship between profitability and leverage. We 
expect a negative relationship between the two variables as did Myers (1984), 
Myers and Majluf (1984), Harris and Raviv (1991) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995).   
The variable Firm Size is defined as the logarithm of Total Assets. This 
logarithm will be used to establish a relationship between size and leverage, 
like it was done by Frank and Goyal (2009) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
Following these authors, the Pecking Order and Trade-Off theories, we expect a 
positive relationship between both variables, since larger firms tend to be less 
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susceptible to bankruptcy and more diversified (Titman and Wessels, 1988) and 
because they are more complex and less transparent (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
The nature of assets also has influence in this matter and therefore the 
Tangibility variable is defined as the ratio between net property, plant and 
equipment over total assets (Frank and Goyal, 2009). According to Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988), we also expect that the 
relationship between tangibility and leverage is positive, since credit is granted 
to large firms more easily. 
The Growth variable is defined as the ratio between capital expenditures 
(CAPEX) and total assets as used by Frank and Goyal (2009). In agreement with 
Fama and French (2002) and the Trade-Off theory and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) an inverse relationship is expected between growth and leverage. 
The Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) variable is defined as depreciations and 
amortizations over total assets. Following Frank and Goyal (2009) and Fama 
and French (2002) studies, and since the authors reached a negative relationship 
between leverage and NDTS, we expect the same inverse relationship. 
The Uniqueness variable is defined as the ratio between selling expenses and 
sales – the same ratio used by Titman and Wessels (1988) to investigate the 
relationship between uniqueness and leverage. It is expected a negative 
relationship (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
The Tax Rate variable is presented as the ratio between the tax effectively 
paid by companies over pre-tax earnings (EBIT). Following Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) and Frank and Goyal (2009), it is expected that the 
relationship between Taxes and Leverage is positive. 
Table 1 summarizes all variables in this study. 
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Variable Ratio 
Expected Impact 
on Leverage 
 
Profitability 
  
 
Firm Size 
  
 
Tangibility 
  
 
Growth 
  
 
Non-debt Tax 
Shields 
  
 
Uniqueness 
  
 
Tax Rate 
 
 
 
Leverage 
  
Table 1 - Proxies for Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 +𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
+ 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
 
− 
+ 
+ 
− 
− 
− 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
Within this chapter, the results obtained in Stata 8  are presented and 
discussed from the preliminary analysis plus the results of the regression model 
with firm-fixed effects.  
 
1. Preliminary Analysis 
 
The preliminary analysis analyses independent variables – Profitability, Firm 
Size, Tangibility, Growth Opportunities, Non-debt Tax Shields, Uniqueness and 
Tax Rate – and the dependent variable – Leverage - results without applying 
any econometric model. Since the study is about capital structure from Portugal 
and Ireland’s listed firms the sample is not that extensive, and consequently, the 
number of observations is also narrow. 
Variables are calculated using different ratios. According to the literature, 
some of these ratios need to be included within intervals or cannot be higher or 
lower than specific values – this happens because when studying so many and 
different observations, it is recurrent to obtain abnormal values that only with 
great difficulty can be found in the real world. That said, we have different 
limits established for each variable in order to eliminate those abnormal or 
irregular values from the normal distribution tails to get as close as possible 
from the reality. 
                                                 
8 Stata is a Software for Statistics and Data Science. 
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Table 2 presents the relevant corrections. 
 
Variable Conditions 
Leverage According to Kayhan and Titman (2007), Leverage needs 
to be lower or equal to one. 
Profitability According to Frank and Goyal (2003), there is the need to 
remove values which are most extreme at 0,50% in either 
tail of the normal distribution. 
Firm Size As it is already a logarithm there are no conditions to 
apply. 
Tangibility As tangible assets cannot be higher than total assets, 
Tangibility needs to between [0; 1]. 
Growth     
Opportunities 
Since it is abnormal that a firm presents values of CAPEX 
higher than total assets, observations outside the interval 
[-1; 1] are deleted. 
Non-debt tax shields As a firm cannot present higher values of depreciation 
when compared to total assets, NDTS values need to be 
between [0;1]. 
Uniqueness As it is irregular that firms present a value of selling 
expenses higher than value of total assets, observations 
outside [0;1] are dropped 
Tax Rate According to Frank and Goyal (2003), there is the need to 
remove all values which are most extreme at 0,50% in 
either tail of normal distribution. 
Table 2 – Variables definitions of values 
 
These corrections done, we can now analyze the summary statistics present 
in Table 3. 
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Variables 
Pre-crisis Period 
2000-2007 
US Financial Crisis Period 
2008-2010 
European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis Period 2011-2017 
PT IRL PT IRL PT IRL 
PROFIT 
 Mean 0.118 0.109 0.114 0.070 0.107 0.090 
 Median 0.117 0.119 0.119 0.091 0.110 0.096 
 Std. Dev 0.082 0.151 0.099 0.158 0.066 0.120 
 Minimum -0.601 -1.990 -0.919 -1.311 -0.652 -1.724 
 Maximum 0.410 0.431 0.342 0.429 0.330 0.418 
SIZE 
 Mean 17.355 13.692 17.430 14.199 17.775 14.444 
 Median 18.077 13.667 18.154 14.175 18.306 14.353 
 Std. Dev 2.563 2.258 2.566 2.253 2.535 2.224 
 Minimum 10.857 6.984 11.384 7.220 8.063 7.674 
 Maximum 22.853 20.782 23.571 20.260 24.453 20.511 
TANG 
 Mean 0.370 0.371 0.346 0.319 0.321 0.314 
 Median 0.360 0.298 0.339 0.244 0.314 0.208 
 Std. Dev 0.135 0.266 0.149 0.262 0.145 0.281 
 Minimum 0.004 -0.000 0.724 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 0.758 0.958 0.006 0.916 0.740 0.987 
GROWTH 
 Mean 0.071 0.067 0.068 0.061 0.060 0.041 
 Median 0.063 0.043 0.060 0.038 0.025 0.024 
 Std. Dev 0.046 0.080 0.048 0.074 0.050 0.053 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.072 0.000 
 Maximum 0.341 0.652 0.266 0.592 0.631 0.650 
NDTS 
 Mean 0.050 0.045 0.052 0.038 0.042 0.040 
 Median 0.047 0.039 0.047 0.033 0.040 0.034 
 Std. Dev 0.026 0.034 0.029 0.025 0.025 0.027 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 0.173 0.311 0.153 0.194 0.233 0.188 
UNIQUE 
 Mean 0.128 0.262 0.123 0.269 0.123 0.282 
 Median 0.114 0.193 0.106 0.167 0.104 0.247 
 Std. Dev 0.074 0.210 0.078 0.224 0.075 0.194 
 Minimum 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.702 0.995 
 Maximum 0.670 0.993 0.885 0.999 0.004 0.003 
TAX 
 Mean 0.276 0.199 0.230 0.154 0.244 0.163 
 Median 0.282 0.193 0.219 0.150 0.226 0.164 
 Std. Dev 0.193 0.190 0.226 0.179 0.199 0.171 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 1.845 1.748 2.588 1.619 2.271 2.072 
LEVERAGE 
 Mean 0.111 0.149 0.105 0.102 0.069 0.102 
 Median 0.035 0.043 0.039 0.047 0.031 0.038 
 Std. Dev 0.223 0.276 0.195 0.185 0.126 0.183 
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Nr obs.  1062 1013 521 458 1204 949 
Table 3 – Summary Statistics for independent and dependent variables  
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In the first period of the time sample, between 2000 and 2007, a median Irish 
firm was more profitable than a median Portuguese one, as the values of 
EBITDA over Total Assets are 0.117 and 0.119 for Portugal and Ireland, 
respectively. However, when both countries faced the consequences of the US 
financial crisis, the median value of profitability for a Portuguese company 
increased to 0.119, when the Irish median value decreased to 0.091 – meaning 
that Irish firms were affected earlier than the Portuguese firms. As for the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis period, the opposite happened, since the Irish 
median value of profitability increased to 0.096, when compared to the previous 
period, and the Portuguese one decreased to 0.110, even lower than the value in 
the begging period of the time sample.  
By analyzing the firm sizes within both countries, for the pre-crisis period, 
between 2000 and 2007, median firm size value is higher in Portugal than in 
Ireland – being these values 18.077 and 13.667, respectively. For the periods of 
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis, median firm size values 
kept increasing, being 18.154 and 14.175 for Portugal and Ireland, respectively, 
for the period between 2008 and 2010; and 18.306 and 14.353 for the European 
Sovereign Debt  Crisis period. We can infer that even with the economic 
struggles, firms kept increasing its tangible assets/size. 
During the pre-crisis period, we can infer that the median amount of tangible 
assets, that were part of each countries’ firms’ asset structure, are quite different 
as Portuguese firms have 36% and Irish firms have 29.8%, not even reaching 
30%.  As firms are economically shaken due to both crisis, the median value of 
tangible assets decreases for both countries in the last two periods. In each 
period, Irish and Portuguese firms saw their tangible assets decreasing to 
values lower than the ones during the pre-crisis period.  
Portuguese firms had, during pre-crisis period, more growth opportunities 
than Irish firms - as Portuguese median value is 6.3% and the Irish one is 4.3%. 
These values decreased, when entering the US financial crisis period, being the 
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median value for Portuguese firms equal to 6.0% and 3.8% to Irish firms. This 
was almost expected since with all the economic system down, it is difficult for 
a company to keep growing or embracing new opportunities when facing 
difficulties. The same thing happened during the last period – between 2011 
and 2017 - as then both countries were affected by the European Sovereign debt 
crisis. Both Portuguese and Irish median values decreased during these difficult 
times to, respectively, 4.1% and 2.4%. During all time samples – from 2000 until 
2017 – the amount of growth opportunities was always higher for Portuguese 
firms than for Irish ones, nevertheless, these median values decreased, for 18 
years, for firms in both countries. 
Non-debt tax shields, during the pre-crisis period, are higher for a median 
Portuguese firm, with 4,7%, than for a median Irish firm, with 3,9%. This 
tendency is the same during the US financial crisis period, since a median 
Portuguese firm has a value of 4,7% and a median Irish firm has a value of 
3,3%. In the following period, the gap between both values is smaller, since a 
median Portuguese firm has a non-debt tax shields value equal to 4% and a 
median Irish firm a value equal to 3,4%. Analyzing the big picture, during the 
2000-2010 period, the non-debt tax shields in Portugal were constant, while 
during the European Sovereign Crisis period this value decreased from 4,7% to 
4%. In Ireland, the determinant behavior was slightly different, since there was 
a decrease between the pre-crisis period until the US financial crisis period, 
from 3,9% to 3,3%. However, during the remaining of the years, the non-debt 
tax shields value stays constant. 
During the pre-crisis period, the uniqueness value for a median Portuguese 
firm was lower than the value for a median Irish firm, being equal to 11,4% and 
19,3%, respectively. In the second period - US financial crisis period - both 
values decreased. A median Portuguese firm has an  uniqueness percentage of 
10,6%, while a median Irish firm has an uniqueness percentage of 16,7%. 
During the European Sovereign Debt Crisis period, the uniqueness percentage 
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was basically the same for a median Portuguese firm, equal to 10,4%. However, 
there was a sharp increase in the uniqueness percentage for a median Irish firm, 
reaching 24,7%. Analyzing all the above values, there is clear difference 
between both countries: in Portugal, uniqueness percentage suffered a slightly 
decrease since 2000, while in Ireland, after a fall between the two first periods, 
form 19,3% to 16,7%, there was a huge increase in this determinant during the 
2011-2017 period, where the determinant’s value increased by approximately 
50%.  
Tax rate variable in 2000-2007 period is higher for a median Portuguese firm 
than for a median Irish firm, as the values are 28,2% and 19,3% , respectively. In 
the next period, a median Portuguese firm, with 21,9%, remains with a higher 
tax rate value than a median Irish firm with 15%. Finally, during the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis period, a median Portuguese firm has a tax rate value of 
22,6%, while a median Irish firm has a value of 16,4%. Looking to the results, 
median tax rates are constantly high for Portuguese firms, even though they 
have suffered a big decrease from pre-crisis period to US financial crisis period. 
Ireland tax rates also suffered a decrease during the time of the US financial 
crisis, but as Portuguese firms alike, they remained basically constant in the two 
following periods. 
The dependent variable Leverage is not as high as expected in neither one of 
the three periods. During the pre-crisis period the mean value of leverage 
among Portuguese firms was equal to 11.1%, meaning that a median 
Portuguese firm had at least 11% of debt in its capital structure during this 
period. The mean value of leverage within Irish firms, in this mentioned period, 
is equal to 14.9%, meaning that a median Irish firm had at least 14% of leverage 
in its capital structure. During the US financial crisis period, it was expected 
that firms would have increased their indebtedness level; however, as 
presented in Table 3, this is not the case, since mean Portuguese value is 10.5% 
and Irish mean value is 10.2% - meaning that both countries listed firms 
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decreased the amount of leverage. Another curious thing happens during the 
last period of the time sample. The mean value of leverage of Portuguese firms 
decreased to 6.9% and mean value of the Irish firms’ leverage stayed the same 
as in the previous period.  
Continuing to analyze the dependent variable, Figure 13 is presented below 
with a graph with median leverage of both Portuguese and Irish firms. These 
values are somehow lower than the mean, which is normal – the fact that the 
mean is higher than the median signifies that within the median we have a 
higher volume of companies that really have low values of leverage; however, 
as we have a considered normal level of mean leverage this also means that 
there are some firms with higher levels of leverage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 -  Graph with median Leverage presented by country and by period 
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2. Regression Results 
 
The question we want to answer is “What was the impact of the US financial 
crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis on Portuguese and Irish listed 
firms’ capital structure?”. The results presented in Table 4 are the results from 
the regression of the econometric model showed in section 2 of the 
Methodology chapter. 
According to Greene (2012), there are three main statistical assumptions that 
must be verified before analyzing results: the multicollinearity assumption, the 
endogeneity assumption and the heteroskedasticity assumption. The 
endogeneity assumption is about controlling the omitted variables in the error 
term (Greene, 2012) – in a fix-effect model this assumption is not pertinent. The 
multicollinearity assumption assumes that all explanatory variables are 
perfectly collinear among them. To assess this assumption, it was done an 
analysis of the correlation between all the variables in the model9. It is possible 
to conclude that as values of correlation are not above 0.8, there are no 
multicollinearity problems. The heteroskedasticity assumption assumes that the 
variance error term is not the same within all observations. To verify the last 
assumption, all estimators of the econometric model will be regressed under a 
robust estimation which will let us use a fixed-effect model without 
heteroskedasticity issues (Greene, 2012). All assumptions are verified. 
This model includes firm-fixed effects because fixed effects assume the 
existence of correlation between the independent variables and the omitted 
variables, that are within the error term, and attempt to control this correlation 
(Greene, 2012). The use of fixed-effects in an econometric model, when studying 
capital structure choices, is defended by Frank and Goyal (2009) and Flannery 
and Ragan (2006). This model was empirically applied for the three different 
periods within the time sample: the pre-crisis period (2000-2007), the US 
                                                 
9 See Appendix for correlation results. 
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financial crisis period (2008-2010) and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
period (2011-2017). Also, within each period, the model was made based on the 
two countries in study, Portugal and Ireland. 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Pre-crisis Period 
2000-2007 
US Financial Crisis 
Period - 2008-2010 
European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis Period - 2011-2017 
PT IRL PT IRL PT IRL 
Constant 1.945 *** 0.670 *** - 0.020 - 0.224 0.299 ** 1.759 *** 
       
 (0249) (0.164) (0.492) (0.355) (0.150) (0.204) 
PROFIT 0.048 0.055 - 0.077 0.023 - 0.082 0.009 
 (0.085) (0.052) (0.058) (0.044) (0.062) (0.064) 
       
SIZE - 0.104 *** - 0.046 *** 0.005 0.022 - 0.009 - 0.115*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.027) (0.025) (0.008) (0.014) 
       
TANG - 0.014 0.263 *** 0.012 - 0.071 0.082 0.034 
 (0.095) (0.064) (0.119) (0.064) (0.060) (0.067) 
       
GROWTH - 0.161 - 0.156 * 0.122 0.022 - 0.418 *** - 0.025 
 (0.142) (0.087) (0.132) (0.085) (0.077) (0.116) 
       
NDTS - 0.464 0.689 *** 0.566 1.124 - 1.731 *** - 0.580 
 (0.440) (0.247) (0.426) (0.564) (0.276) (0.380) 
       
UNIQUE - 0.075 - 0.091 * 0.101 0.022 0.055 0.058 
 (0.115) (0.047) (0.093) (0.057) (0.071) (0.045) 
       
TAXRATE 0.033 0.037 - 0.026 - 0.067 0.015 - 0.034 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.020) (0.036) (0.015) (0.035) 
       
FIRM 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Nr. Obs. 1062 1013 521 458 1204 949 
Adj. R2 0.5751 0.7686 0.8424 0.8254 0.5517 0.6317 
F-test 9.13*** 7.47*** 1.69 1.39 10.07*** 10.87*** 
*,**,*** indicate that the coefficients presented are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Table 4 – Regression results from the econometric model 
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At the end of Table 4, the number of observations which varies across 
countries and across periods is presented. The total amount of observations is 
not high - this happens because as we are studying 18 years of data, it is normal 
that not all firms were active or listed during all that time, and some of them 
can be very recent not existing or not being listed in the beginning of the time 
sample.  
As the R2 of the regression model tend to increase as explanatory variables 
are added to the model, but not always meaning that it is a better fit - this said, 
it is better to analyze the adjusted R2. In this model it ranges from 55.17% to 
84.24% to Portugal and 63.17% to 82.54% to Ireland.  
The overall F-test tells if the regression model has explanatory power and if 
can be relied on. In this case, we can see that the model has explanatory power 
when regressing for Portugal and Ireland firms within the pre-crisis and the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis periods, as the F-test is significant at 1% 
significance level.  
Starting the analysis of Table 4, we can see that profitability is not a 
significant variable in either of the periods analyzed in this model. This means 
that, in this case, profitability was not a relevant capital structure determinant 
as expected by literature – being more or less profitable didn’t influence the 
financing decisions of the sample firms during these eighteen years. We can 
infer that it is not possible to accept or reject the hypothesis of profitability 
having impact on both Portuguese and Irish firms’ capital structure (with a 
significance level of 5%). 
During the pre-crisis period it is possible to infer from the same table (Table 
4) that firm size is significant for both Portugal and Ireland’s firms, at 1% 
significance level but the relationship is contrary to the expected one. This 
means that during this first period, larger firms had a lower leverage ratio. Yet, 
during the US financial crisis the relationship established is a positive one, as 
expected by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and 
  60 
Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank ang Goyal (2009) as more 
diversified and larger firms face lower default risk and consequently make 
greater use of debt. This determinant is not significant anymore, meaning that 
firm size did not influence firms’ capital structure during this period of 
financial crisis as it was supposed to, in both countries. A curious thing 
happens in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis period: the firm size 
determinant is only significant for Irish firm’s level of indebtedness – meaning 
that a bigger Irish firm had less debt, even if the relationship is inverse as 
opposed to the expected.  
In the pre-crisis period we can observe that tangibility was a significant 
determinant for the Irish firms’ capital structure, at a significance level of 1%. A 
positive relationship between tangibility and leverage ratio – expected by, 
among others, Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988) - , is also observed in the same Irish firms’ results within the same period 
mentioned before. Firms with more tangible assets in Ireland had, on average, 
higher levels of leverage. For the US financial crisis period and European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis period, this determinant is insignificant for Ireland. In the 
Portuguese case, this determinant is insignificant for all time sample. 
Looking now to growth opportunities in Table 4 the negative relationship 
expected by Miller (1977), Fama and French (2002) and supported by the Trade-
Off theory plus significant relationship is only observed in two of the three 
periods – pre-crisis period and European Sovereign Debt Crisis. In the pre-crisis 
period, this determinant is significant, at a 10% level of significance, for the Irish 
firm’s capital structure. We can also infer from the same table (Table 4) that the 
expected, and this time significant at 1% level, relationship in the last period of 
this time sample occurs within Portuguese firms. This means that during the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis, Portuguese firms with more growth 
opportunities had less leverage (Miller, 1977). The inverse relationship is also 
observed for Portuguese firms between 2000 and 2007; and for Irish firms 
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during the last 7 years of the complete time sample. As for the period between 
2008 and 2010, the relationship observed is in accordance with what the Agency 
theory defends which aligned with Jensen and Meckling (1976) opinion. 
Moving to the non-debt tax shields, the negative expected relationship is not 
observed in all the periods. This determinant is significant for Portuguese and 
Irish companies, but in different periods. We can observe that non-debt tax 
shields are significant, at 1% level of significance, for Irish firms during the pre-
crisis period, but the relationship established is not the expected one, since it is 
positive. Meaning, that Irish firms which were getting more leverage were 
getting more non-debt tax-shields. The opposite relationship occurs in the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis period but for Portuguese firms which is as 
expected by DeAngelo and Masulis’ (1980) studies - plus the result is significant 
at 1%. As Titman and Wessels (1988) results could not support the impact of 
non-debt tax shields in firm’s leverage ratios, we also cannot support the impact 
of non-debt tax shields for Portuguese firms during the first period, for Irish 
firms during the last period and for both countries firms during the US financial 
crisis period. For both countries the relationship established between NDTS and 
Leverage was positive but not significant for the model during the US financial 
crisis period. The expected relationship is observed for Portuguese and Irish 
firms on the pre-crisis period and European Sovereign Debt Crisis period, 
respectively. 
Regarding uniqueness this determinant is not so significant in the model as it 
is only significant, at a 10% significance level, for Irish firms in the pre-crisis 
period - presenting the expected relationship. This determinant also presents 
the expected relationship within Portuguese firms during the same period, 
however it is not significant. For the two missing periods this variable has the 
contrary relationship to the expected one meaning that for these companies the 
more unique products they produced and sold more leverage they would have, 
opposed to Titman and Wessels (1988) and Frank and Goyal’s (2009) studies – 
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however this did not influence, in this model, capital structure during the two 
crisis periods. 
Analyzing the tax rate variable we can infer that for all periods, the tax rate 
variable had no significant impact on firms’ capital structure of both Portugal 
and Ireland.  
Observing the overall results, it can be concluded that both Portuguese and 
Irish firms were more influenced by the literature determinants during the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis period when compared to the US financial 
crisis period. This can be inferred as we have Firm Size as a significant 
determinant for Irish firms, and Growth Opportunities and Non-debt tax 
shields as significant determinants for Portuguese firms. Between 2011 and 
2017, Irish firms financing decisions were influenced by their own firm size – 
larger firms had, on average, lower levels of debt. Within the same period, 
Portuguese firms had their capital structure affected by the opportunities of 
growing – more opportunities meant having, on average, less debt - and the 
ones with a higher debt ratio would have, on average, less Non-debt Tax 
Shields.  
We can also see that from pre-crisis to US financial crisis period, the Firm 
Size determinant goes from significant to insignificant. This means that between 
2008 and 2010, Portuguese and Irish firms’ capital structure was not influenced 
by firm’s size. This determinant got to influence again, but only the Irish firms, 
during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis period.  
It was somehow expected that both countries were not that affected between 
2008 and 2010 as these years were more severe in the United States, where the 
financial crisis was born. When this crisis went out of the US and spread 
through Europe, that was when Portugal and Ireland started to feel the 
economic consequences and therefore  firms’ capital structure was affected.  
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Conclusion 
 
First discussed by Durand, in 1952, followed by Modigliani and Miller in 
1958, capital structure is one of the most discussed subjects in the world of 
finance. Different theories were then designed to develop this topic, namely the 
Trade-Off theory, by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Pecking Order Theory, by 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), and the Agency Theory by Jensen 
and Meckling in 1976. This dissertation was written to enlighten some aspects 
of this theme.  
The purpose of this study is to answer the research question: “What was the 
impact of the US financial crisis and the European Sovereign Debt crisis in the 
Portuguese and Irish listed firms’ capital structure?” We aim to understand 
what the impact of both crisis mentioned above was in Portuguese and Irish 
firms’ capital structure.  
To answer the research question, financial and accounting data were 
collected from 672 listed firms both for Portugal and Ireland during a eighteen 
years sample and divided into three periods: pre-crisis period (2000-2007), US 
financial crisis (2008-2010) and European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2010-2017).  
An econometric model was designed to reach an answer and panel data 
methodology was used.  
Based on existing literature on this subject [Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Miller (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Myers and Majluf (1984), Bradley 
et al. (1984), Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Ozkan (2001), Fama and 
French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2009)] seven determinants were studied to see 
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their impact on firms’ capital structure: Profitability, Firm Size, Tangibility, 
Growth Opportunities, Non-debt tax shields, Uniqueness and Tax Rate.  
From the obtained regression results we could assume that for both Irish and 
Portuguese firms, the Profitability determinant has no impact on their capital 
structure as the results presented are insignificant at either significance level. 
The Firm Size determinant was significant during the pre-crisis period, 
presenting a negative relationship in both countries - meaning that larger firms 
had a lower leverage ratio during this first period. In the US Financial crisis 
period, this determinant had no impact on either countries’ firms. For the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the size variable showed an impact only on 
Irish firms’ capital structure presenting a negative relationship – Irish larger 
firms  presented less indebtedness levels. Tangibility had impact only on 
Ireland listed firms, during the pre-crisis period, meaning that firms with more 
tangible assets had higher levels of leverage in the capital structure. For the rest 
of the periods, within Ireland, and for Portuguese firms for all periods, this 
determinant was not significant, not presenting an impact on capital structure. 
Growth Opportunities had an impact on Portuguese firms, where firms with 
more growth opportunities presented a lower amount of leverage, during the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis period. Uniqueness and Tax Rate had no 
impact in either of the countries or periods. 
To answer the research question it was found that determinants had more 
influence on firms’ capital structure during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
period (2011-2017) when compared to the US Financial Crisis period (2008-
2010).  
Based on the research results we can infer by the analysis of the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis period (2011-2017) that Firm Size determinant had 
significant impact on the capital structure, as larger Irish firms had, on average, 
lower levels of debt. Portuguese firms saw their capital structure influenced by 
Growth Opportunities and Non-debt Tax Shields. A Portuguese firm with more 
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growth opportunities had, on average, less debt and a Portuguese firm with 
higher leverage ratio had, on average, lower Non-debt Tax Shields. 
There were some limitations during the elaboration of this dissertation. The 
will to use the highest number of important determinants of capital structure in 
the econometric model decreased the number of observations to less than half 
of the initial value as not all firms presented the information needed to calculate 
the variables’ ratios. Another restriction was the fact of not all listed firms had 
available financial and accounting information in order to get all the proxies 
calculated, which also helped in the reduction of observations. 
For future research we suggest enlarging the research study to other 
countries that were affected by the US Financial Crisis and European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis as Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus. This would help to have more 
data and consequently having a more robust sample and more accurate 
econometric results. In the end, this is better to understand the behavior of 
listed firms’ capital structure in these countries.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 - Correlation within variables for Portugal during pre-crisis period 
Pre-crisis/ 
PT LEVERAGE PROFIT SIZE TANG GROWTH NDTS UNIQUE TAXRATE 
LEVERAGE 1.0000        
PROFIT 0.1054 1.0000       
SIZE -0.2352 0.0635 1.0000      
TANG -0.0499 0.0998 0.0992 1.0000     
GROWTH -0.0020 0.2762 0.0467 0.4553 1.0000    
NDTS - 0.1648 0.2293 0.2128 0.5306 0.5054 1.0000   
UNIQUE 0.1038 -0.2481 -0.2544 -0.1225 -0.1654 -0.2379 1.0000  
TAXRATE -0.0812 0.1747 0.2775 -0.0009 0.0545 0.1405 -0.1204 1.0000 
Pre-crisis/ 
IRL 
LEVERAGE PROFIT SIZE TANG GROWTH NDTS UNIQUE TAXRATE 
LEVERAGE 1.0000        
PROFIT -0.0151 1.0000       
SIZE -0.0961 0.1825 1.0000      
TANG -0.0615 0.1123 0.1748 1.0000     
GROWTH -0.0165 0.0993 0.0172 0.4393 1.000    
NDTS 0.0380 -0.0914 -0.0862 0.2813 0.3918 1.0000   
UNIQUE 0.0560 0.1479 -0.0507 -0.3443 -0.2100 0.0119 1.0000  
TAXRATE -0.0023 0.2695 0.1291 - 0.0575 0.0854 -0.0471 -0.0034 1.0000 
Table 6 - Correlation within variables for Ireland during pre-crisis period 
Table 7 - Correlation within variables for Portugal during US financial crisis period 
US Financ 
Crisis/ PT 
LEVERAGE PROFIT SIZE TANG GROWTH NDTS UNIQUE TAXRATE 
LEVERAGE 1.0000        
PROFIT 0.0979 1.0000       
SIZE -0.2898 0.0065 1.0000      
TANG -0.0510 0.0126 0.2320 1.0000     
GROWTH -0.0217 0.0448 0.1701 0.5402 1.0000    
NDTS -0.1699 0.1056 0.3460 0.5902 0.5480 1.0000   
UNIQUE 0.1307 -0.1442 -0.2603 -0.1809 -0.1797 -0.1935 1.0000  
TAXRATE -0.0603 0.1427 0.1427 -0.0067 -0.0469 0.0365 -0.0631 1.0000 
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US Financ 
Crisis/IRL 
LEVERAGE PROFIT SIZE TANG GROWTH NDTS UNIQUE TAXRATE 
LEVERAGE 1.0000        
PROFIT -0-0477 1.0000       
SIZE -0.0204 0.2652 1.0000      
TANG -0.1085 0.1601 0.1776 1.0000     
GROWTH -0.0722 0.0723 0.0059 0.5060 1.0000    
NDTS -0.0218 0.0521 -0.0140 0.2443 0.2087 1.0000   
UNIQUE 0.1069 -0.0848 -0.0827 -0.3104 -0.1183 -0.0218 1.0000  
TAXRATE -0.0181 0.3184 0.3184 -0.0963 0.0188 -0.0851 -0.0707 1.0000 
European 
Sov Debt 
Crisis / PT 
LEVERAGE PROFIT SIZE TANG GROWTH NDTS UNIQUE TAXRATE 
LEVERAGE 1.0000        
PROFIT -0.0073 1.0000       
SIZE -0.1234 0.1340 1.0000      
TANG -0.0838 -0.0322 0.1324 1.0000     
GROWTH -0.0219 -0.0601 0.0380 0.4956 1.0000    
NDTS 0.0015 0.0937 -0.0327 0.2260 0.1178 1.0000   
UNIQUE 0.1381 0.0256 0.1133 -0.1230 -0.0140 0.0809 1.0000  
TAXRATE -0.0523 0.2526 0.2104 -0.1567 -0.1237 -0.0621 -0-0214 1.0000 
Table 8 - Correlation within variables for Ireland during US financial crisis period 
European 
Sov Debt 
Crisis/IRL 
LEVERAGE PROFIT SIZE TANG GROWTH NDTS UNIQUE TAXRATE 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
1.0000 
       
PROFIT -0.0488 1.0000       
SIZE -0.1770 0.1418 1.000      
TANG -0.0088 0.2775 0.1575 1.0000     
GROWTH -0.0401 -0.0210 0.0512 0.3668 1.0000    
NDTS -0.0188 0.3064 0.1151 0.5524 0.2915 1.0000   
UNIQUE 0.1837 -0.0672 -0.3991 -0.0728 -0.1296 0.0298 1.0000  
TAXRATE -0.0187 0.1088 0.2227 0.0100 0.0006 0.0995 -0.0847 1.0000 
Table 9 - Correlation within variables for Portugal during the European sovereign debt crisis period 
Table 10 - Correlation within variables for Ireland during the European sovereign debt crisis 
